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Abstract—The current system to manage the global pool of
IP addresses is centralized in five transnational organizations,
the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Each of these RIRs
manage the address pool for a large number of countries. Because
the RIRs are private organizations, they are subject to the
legal framework of the country where they are based. This
configuration results in a jurisdictional overflow from the legal
framework of the countries where the RIR is based to all the
countries that the RIRs are serving (the countries served by
the RIRs de facto become subjects of the legal system of the
country where the RIR is hosted). The situation is aggravated by
the deployment of new security techniques such as the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and BGP security (BGPsec),
that enable enforcement of allocations by the RIRs.
In this paper we present InBlock, a blockchain-based dis-
tributed governance body aimed to provide de-centralized man-
agement of IP addresses. InBlock also aims to fulfil the same
objectives as the current IP address allocation system, namely,
uniqueness, fairness, conservation, aggregation, registration and
minimized overhead. InBlock is implemented as a Decentralized
Autonomous Organization, i.e., as a set of blockchain’s smart
contracts in Ethereum. Any entity may request an allocation
of addresses to the InBlock registry by solely performing a
(crypto)currency transfer to the InBlock. The fee required, along
with the annual renewal fee, serves as a mechanism to deter
stockpiling and other wasteful practices.
As with any novel technology, there are many open questions
about the usage of blockchains to build an IP address registry. For
this reason, we believe that practical experimentation is required
in order to have hands-on experiences about such a system.
We propose to conduct an experiment on distributed address
management using InBlock as a starting point to inform future
directions in this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet governance is loosely defined as the development
and application of the set of norms and rules that shape the
use of the Internet [1]. As the complex system the Internet
has become, Internet governance is performed at different
dimensions and by different entities. For example, the set of
rules that are used by the systems to communicate, i.e., the so-
called protocols, are defined by institutions with a technical
focus such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
Some policy issues are regulated by national governments
through legal regulation, such as those related with content
blocking, privacy protection, fundamental human rights, etc.
In this paper, we focus on the administration of the Internet
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Protocol (IP) addresses used to identify and locate of the end
points of Internet communications.
IP addresses are globally administered by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a
private non-profit organization. The global pool of IP addresses
is managed through a hierarchical structure rooted in ICANN.
ICANN delegates ranges of IP addresses to five Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs), the second tier of the hierarchy.
RIRs allocate address blocks to Local Internet Registries
(LIRs, usually Internet Service Providers). End-users normally
obtain addresses from the LIRs and in some cases, directly
from the RIRs.
While this arrangement has generally been successful, it
comes with some rough edges. We argue that this structure for
the governance of the global pool of IP addresses results in a
jurisdictional overflow of the countries where ICANN and the
RIRs are hosted into all the other countries served by ICANN
and the RIRs. ICANN and the RIRs are private organizations
that operate within the legal framework of the countries where
they are based. However, they each manage the IP addresses
for a large set of countries. This implies that for most countries
in the world, the management of a critical Internet resource
such as the IP addresses operates under the legal framework
of a foreign country. In addition, for these countries, any legal
action involving IP address management will be settled in a
foreign court of law, making these resources de facto subject
to laws of a foreign state, as observed in [2]. These concerns
have been recently exacerbated by the development of new
Internet security techniques, as we describe next.
Over the last few decades, the Internet has become part of
the critical infrastructure for most countries. The increasing
concern to guarantee its availability has resulted in the design,
deployment and adoption of new security tools, such as the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and the security
extension to the BGP routing protocol (BGPsec). These tools
aim to provide cryptographic guarantees that whoever is
claiming to have an Internet addressing resource is indeed
the legitimate holder of the resource according to the defined
allocation rules, preventing prefix hijacking attacks and other
vulnerabilities. As such, these mechanisms provide the entities
in the hierarchy of the allocation system (i.e., RIRs, NIRs
and LIRs) a capability that they lacked so far, namely the
capacity to actually enforce the allocations in real time. In
particular, they allow entities in the allocation hierarchy to
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2arbitrarily override an existing IP allocation [3]. So, if/when
these cryptographic techniques are widely adopted, the Internet
Registries will be able to invalidate allocations, disconnecting
whole networks from the Internet, if so dictated by their gov-
erning bodies. We note again that a mismatch exists between
the geographical scope in which legal, operational or even
political decisions are taken (the countries where the RIRs
are based) and their effects (the whole world). This situation
has raised a number of concerns and it may be one of the
reasons behind the lag in the adoption of such technologies.
Note that the attacks they are designed to prevent are very
real, so security measures to protect the Internet are indeed
needed.
The current hierarchical design for managing Internet ad-
dresses was probably the most natural one when it was
created. IP addresses come from a single global pool and in
order to properly perform its function, global uniqueness must
be guaranteed, i.e., the system must prevent that the same
address is simultaneously allocated to two different parties.
When the Internet was designed, the straightforward way of
accomplishing this was to rely on a hierarchical structure
to manage the allocations of IP addresses, preventing the
allocation of the same resource twice.
However, new opportunities for managing namespaces (in
our case, the IP address namespace) surface with the recent
introduction of the blockchain technology. Blockchains are
distributed databases that are controlled through consensus. By
design, they prevent any central authority to control the content
of the database. The blockchain technology provides an oppor-
tunity to explore alternative Internet governance approaches. In
particular, it provides the grounds to create a blockchain-based
registry for Internet resources that is not controlled by any
single entity. This is appealing, as it would more accurately
reflect the current Internet reality as a global network.
In this paper, we present InBlock, a distributed au-
tonomous Internet address registry. The proposed approach
uses blockchain technology to perform the IPv6 address reg-
istry functions. While InBlock supports both IPv4 and IPv6,
we focus on IPv6, as IPv6 has a large remaining pool of
unassigned addresses, while the vast majority of the IPv4
address space has already been assigned [5]. InBlock makes
different trade-offs than the current hierarchical allocation
system. First and most importantly, InBlock is not centrally
controlled, but, as any blockchain-based mechanism, it is
controlled through distributed consensus. InBlock provides
a distributed, automatic, irrevocable, tamper-free, publicly
accessible, privacy-preserving resource allocation mechanism,
designed with the appropriate (economic) incentives to enforce
address conservation. In addition, this solution is compatible
with the cryptographic security architecture developed for the
Internet routing system.
InBlock is a set of programmes that autonomously run in
the blockchain, performing the functions of an IP address
registry, as defined by [6]. In a nutshell, InBlock has a block
of globally routable IP addresses to allocate. To request an
address allocation, an entity transfers a fee to InBlock. Once
the fee transaction has been verified, InBlock annotates in the
blockchain the allocation of a prefix to the requester, serving
as a ledger of the address assignment for any interested party
accessing to the blockchain. Note that, following the paradigm
of code is law, the governance bylaws are defined in the
InBlock code and executed in the same way by any node
validating the blockchain. The human action is limited to the
initial definition of the allocations rules. As a blockchain-based
registry, it is not controlled by any single entity, so when
applied to IP address assignment, it results in a mechanism that
reflects more accurately the current Internet reality as a global
network. This approach provides clear and transparent rules
without any kind of human discretion. Address conservation
is preserved by a fee mechanism which mimics the current
fees charged by the RIRs to the recipients of IP address
allocations. In addition, InBlock provides the means to become
the authoritative database in which the assignee of the prefix
can associate the basic information for the Internet routing
system to operate, currently stored in the Internet Routing
Registries [7], along with the cryptographic information that
may be used to secure the routing system.
It is worth to note that InBlock is designed as an addi-
tional IPv6 registry and not as a replacement for the current
IANA/RIR based one. The current hierarchical system has
stood the test of time, and the ICANN plus RIR system pro-
vides services that are appreciated by the Internet community.
Therefore, we do not devise a migration strategy in which
the information currently hold by the RIRs is transferred to a
blockchain based mechanism. In addition, we are specifically
not engaged in fostering a competition of InBlock with the
current allocation system, for example, by exploiting the lower
costs that an automatic address assigning mechanism would
exhibit in comparison with an organization-based one. We
envision InBlock as just an alternative for entities deeply
concerned about the mismatch in jurisdictions, including the
RIRs themselves, which may not want to be responsible for
address allocations that are subject to legal processes either in
their jurisdiction of in the area in which they operate.
As it is the case for most new disrupting technologies,
there are many open questions about blockchains including
how sustainable are they, how they will evolve, among many
others. We now lie on a crossroad: we have a technology
that has the potential to bring decentralized governance to
the Internet, but it is still too immature to be fully adopted.
On one hand it is in the Internet’s genetic code to embrace
innovation, but on the other hand, there is too much uncertainty
about blockchains and too much at stake to simply adopt an
Internet-wide Blockchain-based registry.
For the aforementioned reasons, we believe it would be
beneficial for the Internet community to perform a series of
experiments on decentralized Internet governance using the
blockchain technology. The proposal is to allocate a small IP
address block out of the global address space for the experi-
ment and to create one or more blockchain-based registries
to manage the allocations out of that address block, with
a predefined lifetime. Such an experiment would enlighten
the community with a hands-on experience to inform future
directions regarding decentralized Internet governance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section
II we describe the current IP address allocation system and
3the entities involved. In order to understand which are the
measures that current key entities can apply to restrict the
ability of third parties to communicate, we sketch the basic
notions of the Internet routing system, and the cryptographic
security standards proposed.
In the next section, we introduce the blockchain technology,
and one of its incarnations, Ethereum, as it is the platform of
choice for developing the InBlock solution.
Section IV is devoted to present the rationale for the design of
InBlock. For doing this, we analyse each of the requirements
for an address allocation system, and how they are fulfilled by
InBlock. Besides, Ethereum restrictions are analysed, to show
that price, latency or throughput of blockchain operations are
appropriate for address allocation needs.
In section V we present an experiment in which InBlock
is used to allocate a small set of addresses. We describe the
objectives of the experiment, and how to run it in controlled,
yet realistic, conditions.
We next describe related work, and we end with the con-
clusions.
The proposed approach falls between the policy and the
computer science arenas. In this paper we focus on the policy
side and we try to present the design of the InBlock from
the perspective of the policy goals. While we try to keep the
technical side to the minimum, we do need to describe some
specific technical aspects to properly describe the proposed
design.
II. BACKGROUND ON IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION AND
ROUTING
A. Address allocations
IP addresses identify the end-points of every Internet com-
munication and serve for providing both identity and location
functions. An IP address is a 32-bit identifier for IPv4, and
a 128-bit identifier for IPv4’s intended replacement, IPv6.
Each network is assigned one or many ranges of IP addresses
(called prefixes), which are non-overlapping with the prefixes
assigned to other networks. The administrator of each network
then assigns IP addresses to the nodes at the network. The
assignment process must consider the limitation of the pools at
the time of allocation, and the need to ensure uniqueness and
proper registration to meet several operational requirements
[4], [8].
In the early days of the Internet, the responsibility for
assigning and managing the global pool of IP addresses was
performed by the University of Southern California as part of
a research project funded by the Defence Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), U.S. Government. Between 1998
and 2016, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), part of the Department of Commerce,
U.S. Government, outsourced the technical management role
to the ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers. In 2016, Internet stakeholders, including the
US government, agreed to let the contract with the U.S.
government expire and ICANN continued to perform the
management of the global pool of Internet addresses, num-
bers and names ever since [9]. Although ICANN’s structure
and governance seeks for accountability and transparency,
the ICANN is ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of the
California State, in which many lawsuits have been filed [10].
ICANN has delegated the address assignment duties to
the five Regional Internet Registries, RIRs, namely AFRINIC
(Africa), APNIC (Asia-Pacific region), ARIN (mainly US
and Canada), LACNIC (Latin America and the Caribbean),
RIPE (Europe, Middle East and Central Asia). RIRs are open
membership-based bodies composed primarily of organiza-
tions that operate networks. The address resources received
from ICANN are assigned according to policies developed
regionally by each RIR, although coordinated with the rest
of them. Then, the resources are allocated to their requesters,
according to six goals explicitly agreed among all RIRs in its
policies [11],[12],[13],[14],[15]:
• Uniqueness: addresses must be globally unique, the rai-
son d´être of the registry.
• Fairness: Current policies are designed to be fair in the
sense that they should be equally applied to all parties
irrespectively of “their location, nationality, size, or any
other factor” [11].
• Conservation. A main goal of the Internet resource al-
location policies is to make a rational use of them and
avoid wasteful practices.
• Aggregation: The core routers of the Internet networks
exchange information about the Internet address space
assigned to each network to perform the global rout-
ing function. In particular, these routers must store and
process advertisements for the prefixes that describe the
address space assigned to every network, so the adver-
tisement of a route can be seen as an externality [8].
The lower the number of prefixes exchanged, the lower
the hardware requirements imposed to all the routers
participating in the interdomain routing system. The
allocation policies aim to reduce the number of prefixes
advertised by fostering hierarchical allocation to some ex-
tent. In particular, allocation policies encourage the use of
provider-based address aggregation as a preferred choice,
by giving large address blocks of so-called Provider
Aggregatable (PA) addresses to network providers, which
in turn suballocate them to end users. In this way, the
routes to many different end users can be advertised
by a single announcement, thus reducing the number of
entries to store and process in the core routers. RIRs
may also perform Provider Independent (PI) assignments
directly to end-users, usually smaller, although they may
be unreachable due to network operators not assuming
the cost of routing them [16].
• Registration: Contact and other information associated
with allocations is stored to help the normal operation of
the Internet, such as serving to troubleshoot connectivity
incidents. The current IANA-RIR based system maintains
both a private and a public database with information
regarding the allocations: first, any registry allocating an
address block keeps (internal) records on the party receiv-
ing the resources. This typically involves a contract which
includes detailed contact information. This information is
4not public and it is not used for Internet operations. It can
be used for legal purposes as long as the legal actions
are valid within the legal context of the host country. In
addition, the party obtaining the resources may use any of
the available Internet Routing Registry (IRR) to publish
contact and technical information related to the resources.
The information stored in the IRR system is reported to
be incomplete or inaccurate in many cases [7].
• Minimised overhead: the allocation system should work
with as little overhead as needed to fulfil its function.
RIRs can allocate Provider Aggregatable (PA) blocks to
Local Internet Registries (LIRs) and they also provide
direct Provider Independent (PI) assignments directly to
end-users. All RIRs define a minimum PA IPv6 allocation
of /32 [11],[12],[13],[14],[15]. The allocations can be
(much) larger if the applicant justifies the needs. In par-
ticular, the larger allocations so far are /20. The minimum
PI allocation is a /48 or a /56 depending on the RIR and
they can be larger if justified.
RIRs charge a yearly membership fee to entities holding
Internet resources. In all RIRs except for RIPE, fees vary
according to the amount of resources received. A /48 PI
allocation fee is in the range of a few hundreds of US$
(between US$ 100 and US$ 800, depending on the RIR).
A /32 PA allocation fee ranges between US$ 1000 and
US $ 2,500. See figure 1 for the detailed information on
the fees.
The current fee structure used by the RIRs is not lineal
with the number of addresses. The fee for a /32 is roughly
one order of magnitude larger than the fee for a /48 while
a /32 contains 216 more addresses than a /48. A similar
effect can be observed in PA allocations of different size,
meaning that the fee for a /20 is significantly less than
212 times the fee for a /32.
Fig. 1: Yearly RIR Fees for Provider Aggregatable address
assignments, 2018
B. Interdomain routing
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used to exchange
prefix reachability information between the different networks
in the Internet. The function the BGP protocol performs is
called interdomain routing. The different networks participat-
ing in the BGP protocol are identified through AS numbers,
32-bit unique identifier. The AS numbers are managed in a
similar way than IP addresses through ICANN and the RIRs.
The original BGP specification lacks of security features
enabling the manipulation of routing information. For exam-
ple, an attacker can advertise someone else’s prefix as its own,
to hijack the traffic for that prefix. In order to prevent such
incidents, the BGP ecosystem has been recently enhanced
with origin validation capabilities. In order to address these
limitations, additional security features have been recently
added to the interdomain routing architecture.
Origin validation is provided by the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [17] architecture. The RPKI architecture
defines a distributed repository that contains Route Origin
Attestations (ROAs), X.509 certificates that are used to assert
that a network (identified its AS number) is authorized to
advertise a given prefix BGP. The trust chain starts from
the RIRs, that issue certificate delegating prefix ranges to
the LIRs, etc., which can in turn issue ROAs. The RIRs
also provide access to repositories with the cryptographic
information issued so far, which at the time of this writing,
comprise 8738 ROAs [18]. ROAs can be used to discard
BGP advertisements, and thus, prevent reachability to certain
prefixes, AS numbers, or combinations of both.
Currently, each RIR has its own RPKI root certificate i.e.,
each RIR has issued self-signed certificates for the whole
address space range of IPv4 and IPv6 [19]. Therefore, a
network willing to perform origin validation for the routes to
the networks of any region of the world can configure the root
certificates of the five RIRs as Trust Anchors, and download
the repositories they hold. Then, they can use this information
to build the router configuration that will filter BGP route
information in real time.
[3] shows that resource certificate issuers can manipulate
at will the contents of their publications; for example, an
entity can issue certificates to invalidate or supersede previous
resource delegations, affecting connectivity with or through
networks performing origin validation. Top-level RPKI enti-
ties, the RIRs, can invalidate or supersede resource allocations
they previously allocated, so they can prevent communication
for any network with a certificate rooted in the Trust Anchor
of the RIR considered.
Moreover, because each RIR has a root certificate for the
whole IP address space, any RIR can issue valid certificates for
any IP prefix. This means that a RIR can issue a certificate
for prefix for which another (valid) certificate, rooted on a
different RIR, exists. For example, although prefix P was
assigned by RIR_A to an entity in its region, out of its own
address pool, and a certificate rooted at RIR_A for prefix
P exists, RIR_B may issue a conflicting certificate for the
same prefix. The resulting behaviour of these actions vary for
different third-party networks and routers, and will depend
on the configuration of the software applying the validation
rules over the RPKI information. The network exposed to
the conflicting certificates may decide to select one of the
certificates (based on explicit preferences on the Trust Anchor,
or in the order in which the information has been processed)
5or to discard both. The implications are that the isolated action
of a RIR over a prefix can invalidate it for all the networks
performing any type of cryptographic validation if the prefix
belongs to its region, and can interfere in ways that are hard
to predict for prefixes belonging to other RIRs.
III. BACKGROUND ON BLOCKCHAINS
A blockchain is an immutable distributed ledger that records
validated transactions permanently without the need of a
trusted third party.
The blockchain is a distributed ledger because all the in-
formation is stored in all the nodes composing the blockchain
peer-to-peer network 1.
The blockchain is composed of a growing list of blocks,
securely linked between each other through cryptography [20].
Every block contains a hash pointer to a parent block, a
timestamp and transactions´ data.
The addition of new valid block is determined through a
distributed consensus mechanism. The consensus is an emerg-
ing artefact representing the agreement reached by over than
thousands of nodes on the blocks added to the blockchain. The
most popular consensus mechanism is Proof-of-Work (PoW)
[21].
In PoW, nodes try to solve a complex mathematical problem
in order to gain the right to append a block to the existent
chain (and make some profit). New block signers are chosen
through a mining race. Every time a block is added, a new
mining race starts and every miner tries to find the solution to
gain the possibility of mining a block and receive the related
fee. Since every miner is working on the same problem, once
it is solved by someone, the computational power spent from
the others on the same problem is wasted. PoW consensus
mechanism is expensive in terms of energy consumption.
The hash structure of the blockchain makes computationally
unfeasible to alter the data of one block without the manip-
ulation of all subsequent blocks. Tampering the ledger then
requires both the collusion of the majority of the network and
an enormous amount of computational power to rebuild the
chain from the replaced block. This is the sense in which we
interpret the immutability of the blockchain.
Finally, we stress that only valid transactions are included
in the blocks forming the blockchain. To determine if a
transaction is valid, all nodes participating comply with the
same block validation rules. For example, a value transaction
must be signed with the private key of the originator.
The blockchain paradigm can be extended to the automation
of complex resource manipulation and transference procedures
in a transparent and trustable manner, by means of the speci-
fication of smart contracts.
A smart contract [22],[23] is a programme that is stored in
the blockchain and is executed by the nodes of the blockchain
network. Once deployed in the blockchain, the blockchain
nodes will execute the smart contract whenever a monetary
transaction to the contract account occurs. Then, every node
1 This is different than other distributed databases, where different parts of
the database are stored in different nodes and there could be some level of
replication just for redundancy and performance benefits
validating the blockchain will execute the code of the contract,
written in the blockchain itself, reaching the same final state.
Ethereum [24] is a public blockchain platform created to
facilitate the development of smart contracts. Ethereum has
a built-in Turing-complete programming language that allow
developers to easily write smart contracts. Every operation in
the network is triggered by transactions between accounts,
that can be externally owned accounts (EOAs), owned and
controlled by users, and contract accounts, associated to a
smart contract which code and state stored with the account
itself. Being a public blockchain, any party can create one
or more EOAs and any party can run a smart contract in
Ethereum.
Ethereum has implemented a PoW-based consensus mech-
anism. Miners are rewarded in Ether, the Ethereum cryptocur-
rency, for the storage and processing power they contribute
to. Users that want to run a smart contract or to use one
issue a transaction in the Ethereum network which includes
a transaction fee payable to the miners. The value (in Ether)
of the transaction fee is set by the user generating the trans-
action and should reflect the number of operation steps to be
performed to accomplish a certain work and the priority that
the user wants to get from the blockchain miners, as higher
transaction fees imply that the transaction will be processed
earlier by the miners. Transaction confirmation times are
estimated around 10 to 15 seconds, depending on storage
needs, code complexity and bandwidth usage.
Ethereum enables the deployment of a Decentralized Au-
tonomous Organization (DAO) [25], an organization that is
fully implemented in the form of one or more smart contracts
without any human involved in the daily operation of the
organization. In particular, the bylaws of the organization are
embedded into the code of the smart contracts. DAO’s financial
transaction records and program rules are maintained on a
blockchain.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED INBLOCK IPV6
REGISTRY
InBlock is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization that
performs IPv6 address allocation registry functions. By au-
tonomous, we mean that the whole organization lies in the
blockchain, in the form of smart contracts that run in the
blockchain without human intervention. It is decentralized
because the smart contracts run on the nodes that are part of the
blockchain. The behaviour of the registry is governed by the
code of the smart contract. Modifications to the information
regarding the registry of IPv6 address blocks are triggered by
blockchain transactions and subject to the consensus mecha-
nism of the blockchain. Therefore, the smart contracts define
what a valid transaction is and then all the nodes of the
blockchain will enforce that only valid transactions modify
the address allocation registry information. Once included in
the blockchain, the allocation of a block is irrevocable.
InBlock is configured with a block of globally routable
IPv6 addresses to allocate. When an entity wants to obtain
an address allocation, it uses its Ethereum account to perform
a request. The request is basically a blockchain transaction
6that transfers a predetermined fee (paid in Ether, the Ethereum
cryptocurrency) to InBlock. InBlock verifies that the transac-
tion is valid and that the fee has been correctly transferred.
Upon reception of the transaction, the InBlock code goes
through its associated state (stored in the blockchain) and
finds an address block that is not currently allocated. InBlock
associates the available block with the identity of the entity
performing the request. This allocation information is recorded
in the blockchain, and is associated to a predefined lifetime.
The holder of the resources can renew the allocation making
a new transaction transferring the yearly fee to the InBlock
before the expiration date. If this happens, InBlock extends
the lifetime of the allocation for another period.
Each IPv6 allocation record stored in the blockchain con-
tains the information about the allocated prefix, the holder
Ethereum Identity, the expiration date and a pointer to addi-
tional information about the holder of the allocation, allowing
the holder to include contact or other route policy information.
As stated above, InBlock defines the rules that govern the
IP address allocation. Phrased in the Internet Registry jargon,
this means that the smart contract will encode the IPv6 address
allocation policy. It is only natural then that the goals for
the design of the InBlock are aligned with the goals of the
existent IPv6 address allocation policies. We next describe
the different mechanisms that are part of InBlock aimed to
fulfil the address assignment goals of uniqueness, registration,
aggregation, conservation, fairness and minimum overhead
stated by the current RIR-based allocation system (see section
II).
A. Uniqueness
To guarantee uniqueness in the address assignment, we
first require that the block of globally routable IPv6 ad-
dresses assigned to InBlock is unique (reserved exclusively
for this purpose). Then we rely on the InBlock code, stored
state, and the blockchain consensus mechanism to ensure that
only unique assignments are valid, and thus, included in the
blockchain registry.
B. Conservation
We identify two different concerns affecting conservation,
namely stockpiling prevention and the reclaim of unused
addresses. We describe the mechanisms used by the InBlock
to deal with each of them separately.
1) Stockpiling prevention: One major concern to be consid-
ered when designing an IP address registry is how to prevent
stockpiling, i.e., the accumulation of resources beyond the
actual legitimate needs of the requesting entity [11], [12], [13],
[15]. IP addresses are valuable assets and given the precedent
regarding IPv4 address space exhaustion, some parties may be
tempted to obtain IPv6 addresses as a precautionary measure
against a possible future scarcity. The InBlock design must
provide the means to prevent or at least to control the extent of
stockpiling. The current IANA-RIR system de-facto uses four
mechanisms to prevent IPv6 address stockpiling. First, they
require a justification for the need of the resources requested
(based on planned needs for IP addresses for initial allocations
and based on the HD ratio metrics regarding subsequent
allocations). Second, the requirement to become member of
the RIR, which implies paying an initial fee, and the charge
of a yearly fee to the parties holding resources, with the fee in
most cases related to the amount of resources received (see 1).
Third, an abundance argument: there are enough addresses for
all future needs, so there is no point in stockpiling. And fourth,
the possibility of reclaiming the addresses allocated if the
holder of the resources does not comply with the requirements
defined in the allocation policy.
In InBlock, we explicitly give up the first and the fourth
mechanisms. In order to achieve full de-centralized control,
the process of granting a new allocation and the process
of renewing it must be fully automatic and encoded in the
blockchain. Both the first and the forth aforementioned mech-
anisms require some form of human intervention, making them
incompatible with the InBlock design goals. We argue that the
remaining two mechanisms, fees and abundance of addresses,
are enough to prevent stockpiling in the IPv6 case.
We next need to define the fee and allocation size structure
that suits the InBlock purposes and deters stockpiling effi-
ciently. We use as a starting point the current size and fee
structure used by the RIRs. As mentioned in section II, the
current fee structure used by the RIRs is not lineal with the
number of addresses.
This poses a challenge for a fee-based automated mecha-
nism aimed to deter address waste such as the InBlock. The
lower the cost per address, the less effective the mechanism to
deter stockpiling and other wasteful practices is. On the other
hand, if the fee is set to the largest cost per address currently
used by the RIRs (e.g., to the cost per address used in /48
PI allocations), this would render the cost of a larger block
impractically high (the cost of a /32 would be tens of millions
of US$ if the cost per address of a /48 is used).
It is challenging for the InBlock to have different cost
per address depending on the size of the allocation, because
this may incentivize applications for larger blocks even when
not needed, resulting in address waste (note that we do not
have a complementary mechanism such as a need assessment
procedure, to modulate user requests). On the same vein,
having a low cost per address in larger allocations may
promote a secondary market, where it is possible to obtain
larger allocation for the same fee (or less) that it would take
to obtain a smaller allocation directly from the InBlock2. This
would again create the incentives for applicants to obtain
larger allocations than what they would really need through
the secondary market, resulting yet again in address waste.
In figure 2, we depict the distribution of block sizes of all
the existent allocations (for all the RIRs3). We observe that,
at the time of this writing, there are 17,795 allocations of /32,
2 Note that this is a risk of the current fee system, in which the cost grows
in a sublinear trend with the number of addresses.
3ftp://ftp.afrinic.net/pub/stats/afrinic/delegated-afrinic-extended-latest
ftp://ftp.apnic.net/pub/stats/apnic/delegated-apnic-extended-latest
ftp://ftp.arin.net/pub/stats/arin/delegated-arin-extended-latest
ftp://ftp.lacnic.net/pub/stats/lacnic/delegated-lacnic-extended-latest
ftp://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripencc/delegated-ripencc-extended-latest
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6,283 allocations of /48, 7,903 allocations of /29. There are
191 allocations larger than /29. So, roughly half of the existent
allocations are /32s, 25% are /29s and the remaining 25% are
PI allocations of /48.
Considering all the above, we propose that the InBlock
only allocates /32s and /48s, charging a fee slightly higher
than the one set by the RIRs. By doing this, we can satisfy
the most common allocation sizes. If an entity requires more
than a /32, it probably can afford to request 2 or even 4 /32s,
paying the corresponding fee for each of them. Since the fee
increases linearly with the number of addresses for allocations
larger than a /32, we believe that this fee structure would be
enough to deter request additional /32 blocks that are not really
needed.
This still does not address the problem regarding wasteful
allocations involving allocations/assignments smaller than /32.
Current RIRs fees are such that a /32 costs in the range of US$
2,500 to US$ 1,000, and a /48 (PI) costs in the range of US$
100 and US$ 800 (plus an additional initial fee in the range
of US$ 250 to US$ 2,500). Suppose that the InBlock charges
US$ 3,000 for a /32 and US$ 300 for a /48. Since the fee is
one order to magnitude larger for a /32 than for a /48, this
is likely to be enough to avoid the majority of applicants that
would satisfy their needs with a /48 to request a /32, reducing
address waste.
A final argument to support that the proposed fee structure
is sufficient to deter stockpiling is the following: If the fee of
a /32 is 3,000 US$, then getting the whole IPv6 address space
would imply a total amount of 12.6 ∗ 1012 US$ (compared to
the world Gross Domestic Product, GDP which is 76 ∗ 1012
US$) making it impossible for any party to even get hold of
a significant chunk of the IPv6 address space.
Some further considerations about the fees.
• Currency: InBlock will define the fee in a fiat currency
(Euros, US$, Yuans) but the InBlock will actually collect
the fee in the cryptocurrency used in the blockchain
(Ether in Ethereum). Because the prices of the cryptocur-
rencies fluctuate significantly, we propose to define the
fee in the fiat currency and convert the fee from the fiat
currency to the current correspondence in Ether.
• Fee Update. Fees cannot be constant because if the fiat
currency value devaluates, the fee will less effective as
a mechanism to deter stockpiling. On the other hand,
InBlock is designed to work without human interaction.
We propose to link the evolution of the fee to the increase
of the world GDP. In this way, the fee will be updated to
preserve its value in the future. Also, making the update
of the automatic (and preventing any human interaction
when defining the fees in the future) provides a stable
framework for parties holding resources and prevents
from having a human deciding on the fees (which may
give the human the power to arbitrarily increase the fee,
and to push the parties out of the system).
• What to do with the fee money? It is worth to note that the
fee, in the ranges discussed above, is just a mechanism
to prevent stockpiling. The actual cost of running the
InBlock is way much less than the fee (see below, we
estimated 15 US$). Several institutions involved in the
resources (ICANN, RIRs, IETF, ISOC) could be natural
recipients of this money, or the money could just be
destroyed (sent to an nonexistent account).
2) Reclaiming unused addresses: With the exhaustion of
IPv4 addresses, attention has been paid to policies to reclaim
unused addresses. However, only market-based approaches
have proven to be effective, as coercive measures face many
challenges [5], [8]. The InBlock expiration model provides
a mechanism to neatly signal the Internet community which
address blocks are in interest for its holder. When an address
allocation is not renewed before its expiration date, the address
block returns to the pool and the address space is eligible for
further reassignment.
Besides, this mechanism serves to fix a well-known issue
with storing tokens in blockchains: if the holder of the resource
loses the private key that secures the allocation, the resource is
lost. In particular, it is estimated that 20% of existing Bitcoins
are “lost” because of this [26].
C. Aggregation
Another important consideration that allocation mechanism
needs to address is related to the preservation of the global
routing table. Due to the large size of the IPv6 address space,
fostering aggregation is crucial for the viability of the routing
system. Current RIR allocation policies promote aggregation
through the preferred use of PA addresses, but they still allow
PI allocations. PI allocations contribute to the size of the
global routing tables as they cannot be aggregated. In the
previous section we presented a fee structure to deter parties
from requesting larger allocations than needed. In this section,
we discuss the factors that hinder the deaggregation resulting
from a secondary market of address blocks. We also present
how InBlock enables aggregation of multiple address blocks
obtained by the same entity through a sparse allocation policy.
1) Deagggregation of address blocks due to secondary
market transfers: One potential concern with the proposed
fee structure is that it may incentivize the creation of a
secondary address market that may extend the use of PI
allocations by end sites as opposed to PA allocation from the
LIRs.
Currently RIRs charge a fee for each PI allocation. While
the current policies do impose a number of requirements on
8end sites requesting PI block, these requirements are usually
in the form of a plan or a prevision regarding the number
of hosts/sites in the near future. We argue that because
the InBlock charges a similar fee than the RIR for a PI
/48 allocation, it is unlikely that there will be an increased
demand of PI allocations due to the InBlock.
The current fee structure would make economically
attractive for a party to obtain a /32 from the InBlock and
re-sell smaller allocations cheaper than the corresponding
fee from the InBlock. This may render PI allocations more
affordable, and parties that would not be willing to pay they
yearly fee that the RIR or the InBlock charges for a /48
allocations, may be willing to obtain a much cheaper /48
from this secondary market. Since these would indeed be PI
allocations (as they are not provided by the ISP), they are
likely to be announced in the global routing table as separated
routes, bloating the routing table. Note that PI allocations
are attractive because they avoid provider lock-in and the
associated renumbering cost if the customer changes ISP.
However, a /48 obtained in the secondary market is not
a perfect substitute of a /48 obtained directly from the
InBlock. The reason is that in the /48 obtained through the
secondary market, there is an intermediary, the reseller. If
the intermediary fails to renew the /32 where the /48 are
extracted from (i.e., because it goes bankrupt), all the /48
allocations will not be renewed neither and the end sites will
lose their addresses. Moreover, once that the end site has
obtained an allocation from the intermediary and configured
in their network, the intermediary has an incentive to increase
the charged fee, since there is a cost from the end user to
renumber its network. The end site would then be trading
ISP lock-in for intermediary lock-in. Nevertheless, it is still
possible that some sites find it attractive to obtain PI blocks
in the secondary market, and negatively impacting the global
routing table. In order to prevent this, the InBlock could limit
the number of different AS numbers used in ROAs within
a single /32 to a maximum number (e.g., 100 different AS
numbers). This restriction would not impose a real restriction
in the operations of ISPs using the /32 for PA allocations,
but would negatively affect the intermediaries that want to
resell PI allocations out of a /32, since it would prevent
all the end sites obtaining an allocation out of a single /32
to use different origin ASes in their ROAs (which is what
they would naturally do when announcing a PI block in the
interdomain routing).
2) Sparse allocation: In order for the multiple blocks
assigned to a single entity to be aggregatable, the InBlock
will use a sparse allocation strategy [27] to manage the overall
pools. This allows the holder of a resource to request for the
contiguous block, so that the multiple blocks that a given entity
obtains from the InBlock are aggregatable.
When submitting a new request for a new block, the
applicant can attach a proof that it holds a block from a
previous allocation. If this is the case, InBlock will allocate a
contiguous block, enabling the aggregation of the two prefixes.
D. Registration
In the case of the InBlock, blockchain identities are mostly
anonymous4. Moreover, payments are done using the cor-
responding Ether, which as of today provides significant
anonymity features. All this implies that the InBlock has
no information about the entity that received the allocation.
InBlock provides the means to voluntarily include contact
information or route policies for each allocation, in a similar
way to Internet Routing Registries [7], but it does not mandate
it. However, it is worth to note that the blockchain enables
a cryptographic link between the holder of the account to
which the address prefix has been assigned, and the routing
information. This means that any other party accessing to this
information can verify that the contact and routing policy
information is authorized by the assignee of the Internet
resources.
In summary, InBlock provides stronger privacy features than
the current IANA-RIR system while still enabling resource
holders to voluntarily provide contact and routing informa-
tion for operational purposes. Besides, InBlock lacks strong
traceability features available in the IANA-RIR system for
lawful purposes. We argue that this is an appropriate approach
and that the traceability for legal reasons should be pursued
through the ISPs providing connectivity to the allocated ad-
dress block. The reason why we find this appropriate is that the
InBlock provides a global service, hence it should avoid the
asymmetry existing in the current IANA-RIR system between
the country hosting the registry and the rest of the countries.
Pursuing legal actions through the ISPs providing connectivity
to the allocated prefix seems to provide a better match between
the scope of the organization and the scope of the legal
framework.
E. Fairness
Fairness is an explicit goal in current RIR address alloca-
tions policies. Fairness in this context means that the policies
should be equally applied to all parties irrespectively of “their
location, nationality, size, or any other factor” [11]. InBlock
naturally achieves that goal, since any party can obtain an
Ethereum identity and then it can obtain an allocation from
the InBlock.
Moreover, InBlock takes a step further in the fairness
domain, and achieves jurisdictional fairness. As stated earlier,
one explicit goal of the InBlock design is to prevent the so-
called jurisdictional overflow, where the allocations of entities
in one country are under the jurisdiction of another country.
We can phrase this in terms of fairness, i.e., that every entity
has the right that its address allocations are not ruled by the
legal framework of another country. This is not the case today,
since allocations to entities based in the countries where the
RIRs are based are ruled by their national law system, while
for allocation to all other entities are ruled by foreign legal
systems.
4Identities are not perfectly anonymous, since there are means to try to link
an Ethereum identity to a physical entity, but in general, it is not required prior
identification to obtain a Ethereum identity.
9F. Minimised overhead
By all accounts, the InBlock operation is very efficient and
provides reduced overhead. As there are no humans involved
in the operation, the costs are very low (about US$ 15, see
section IV-G). Also, the time-scale of operation of the InBlock
is significantly shorter than the current system. Allocations in
InBlock are completed in the order of minutes (see section
IV-G).
G. Ethereum Technological aspects
We now discuss technological aspects related to the spe-
cific platform of choice, Ethereum. We justify the selection
of Ethereum for this purpose. Then we cursorily analyse
if Ethereum can provide the latency, throughput and cost
required by InBlock.
We design InBlock as a set of smart contracts on top of
Ethereum. Previous proposals [28],[29],[30] suggest to create
a new blockchain to store information regarding IP address
allocation (see the Related work section for further details
about these proposals). In InBlock, instead of creating a new
blockchain, we propose to use an existing one. We believe this
approach provides three important benefits.
First, it provides a clean architecture with layered design
that separates the blockchain from the registry service. This
allows the evolution of the blockchain without affecting the
registry service. By laying the InBlock on top of an existing
(and evolving) blockchain, we make InBlock agnostic to the
consensus mechanism. In particular, Ethereum currently uses
PoW (which is the proven technology) and it is experimenting
with PoS [31], as it may be a more sustainable alternative.
Once/if PoS is proven and stable, Ethereum will migrate to
PoS and InBlock will benefit from this technological advance
without any impact.
Second, by using an existing blockchain, we can rapidly
develop and deploy InBlock. For example, Ethereum is already
available and working. By using Ethereum, we reduce the
development time, as we only need to focus in the implemen-
tation of the registry service. All blockchain code evolution
and testing5 are taken care of by the Ethereum community.
Third, using an existing blockchain provides secure boot-
strapping, i.e., a secure blockchain from the start of In-
Block deployment. Blockchain security heavily depends on
the consensus mechanism used (e.g., PoW, PoS). The level of
security of the consensus mechanism frequently depends on
the level of adoption of the blockchain. A blockchain using
PoW is as strong as the hashing power used to mine blocks
[32],[21]. In a new blockchain, it is likely that there will be
little hashing power as there is little economical gain from
mining it. If PoS is used instead, the level of security depends
on the number of stakeholders, the concentration of stake
and also how much actual value is there in the blockchain
[33],[21]. In a new PoS blockchain, it is likely that there will
significant concentration of stake and a reduced number of
stakeholders control the blockchain. In the case of InBlock, the
IPv6 addresses managed by the InBlock registry are valuable
5Notable bugs have been identified in different blockchains in the past [40].
per se, prior to the existence of the blockchain. So, if the
blockchain provides little security in its early days, there is a
risk of an attack directed towards the illegitimate acquisition
of allocations. The InBlock must then provide strong security
from the bootstrap to be viable and using Ethereum achieves
this goal.
Due to the facilities provided to develop smart contracts,
and its relative maturity, Ethereum is our blockchain of choice.
While the use of Ethereum seems to provide many advantages
when building InBlock, we need to verify that Ethereum is also
a good fit in terms of performance and cost. We next analyse
different relevant parameters:
• Timescale: There are roughly three delays involved in
an Ethereum transaction, namely, the time it takes for
a miner to include a transaction in a block that it is
mining, the time it takes to mine the block containing the
transaction and the time it takes for the block containing
the transaction to be confirmed. Regarding the first delay,
miners receive many transactions that are candidates to be
included in the next block to be mined. Miners determine
which transactions may be included in the current block
according to the transaction fee offered (transactions that
are willing to pay more get in the blockchain earlier).
According to current prices [34], if the InBlock trans-
action is willing to pay US$ 2 per allocation, the delay
to be included in the next block is less than 2 minutes.
Regarding the second type of delay, Ethereum publishes
a new block every 17 seconds. Finally, assuming that
InBlock will wait for 12 new blocks to confirm the
transactions containing the allocations [35], this means
that it will take about 3 more minutes to confirm the
allocation transaction. So, the total delay for an InBlock
transaction to be published and confirmed in Ethereum
will be in the order of 5 minutes. Currently it takes days
to grant new allocations, so the timescale provided by
Ethereum is much shorter than the one provided by the
current allocation system.
• Throughput: Ethereum currently has a mean throughput
of 20 transactions per second. In order to estimate the
maximum throughput that could be required by InBlock,
we compute the number of transaction that it would
require renewing yearly all the current IPv4 and IPv6
allocations, plus the transaction resulting from the new
IPv4 and IPv6 allocation done every year. This results in
58,700 transactions per year, 0.0019 transactions per sec-
ond, which is much less than the transaction throughput
currently supported by Ethereum.
• Cost. In order to run in Ethereum, InBlock needs to pay
to the Ethereum network in the form of a transaction
fee. Executing InBlock implies the following expenses.
First, the deployment of the InBlock code in the Ethereum
network requires a transaction fee. We estimate roughly
between US$ 400 and US$ 800 for this. Assuming that
the InBlock is managing a /20 address block, this results
in less than US$ 0.5 per block (but this cost needs
to be paid upfront when InBlock is launched). Once
deployed, we estimate in around US$ 15 the costs of the
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transactions required to assign a block. There are other
transactions required to run InBlock that will incur in
additional costs (like calls to the different oracles, see
below) but these can be considered negligible. Note that
the cost of a transaction fee is likely to change with time,
and it is expected that the it will increase as Ethereum
becomes popular. If InBlock defines a fixed transaction
fee according to current values, it is possible that this
value will become outdated and that InBlock transaction
become unattractive for miners to include them in new
blocks they are mining. Because of this, the transaction
fee used by the InBlock must be updated according to
reflect the values expected by the miners at every time.
This can be done in Ethereum implementing an “oracle”
[36] that provides the InBlock with updated values to use
for transaction fees.
V. PROPOSED EXPERIMENT
As the blockchain technology is fairly new, probably sus-
ceptible to bugs, and fast evolution, and the IP address
allocation apparatus is a cornerstone of the Internet, we are
not proposing to create an operational IPv6 registry using
InBlock. Instead, we are promoting to do an experiment
with a limited scope, to gain a better understanding of how
blockchain technology can be used to provide registry ser-
vices for Internet resources and moreover, if the notion of a
distributed autonomous registry is feasible.
Through the proposed experiment, we believe we can gain
a better understanding of the following aspects:
• Whether the proposed approach based on a yearly fee is
enough to deter stockpiling.
• Whether the addresses obtained from the InBlock are
actually used and announced in the Internet. Whether
the blocks are announced as they are assigned, or extra
deaggregation is observed.
• Whether a secondary market of addresses emerges.
• Whether the number of PI allocations increases.
• Whether the contact information of the allocated blocks
is completed and updated with sound contents.
• How changes in the Ethereum affect the InBlock service.
In particular, when bugs appear, how much they affect the
InBlock service and whether it is possible to cope with
them. Also, how technological leaps in Ethereum affect
the InBlock service (e.g., if Ethereum moves from PoW
to PoS, how this affects InBlock).
The experiment, by definition, has a limited lifetime. The
lifetime should be defined in advance, before starting the
experiment. A reasonable timeframe could be five years. If the
experiment is a success, the lifetime of the experiment can be
extended and the allocations made renewable for as long as the
holders want to renew them. If the experiment is terminated,
the allocations made through the InBlock should be formalized
upon its termination in one of the existent Internet registries.
This would allow organizations participating in the InBlock
experiment and using the allocated addresses to avoid the cost
of renumbering regardless the result of the experiment. With
this conditions, the InBlock experiment is likely to be more
realistic, as more organizations may use the resources obtained
through the InBlock in real operations.
The experiment should include some safeguards in case an
unexpected behaviour is observed. For instance, it would be
beneficial to rate limit the number of allocations made. If the
rate in the applications is excessive, the experiments should
be paused and pass the control to human supervisors.
In order to run the InBlock experiment, a pool of globally
unique addresses is needed. The organizations that can provide
the required pool of addresses and run the experiment are:
the IETF (80% of the IPv6 address space is “Reserved for
the IETF” [37], and it is up to the IETF to instruct IANA
to allocate an address block for the InBlock experiment),
ICANN through the IANA, the RIRs (either one RIR on its
own, or jointly through the NRO), or a NIR (National Internet
Registry).
In addition of providing the addresses required to per-
form the experiment, the organization running the experiment
should also be capable of properly designing and implement-
ing it. In this document we propose InBlock as a starting
point for that debate, but in order for the experiment to be
useful, the Internet community should be actively engaged
in the ultimate design of the experiment. Similarly, once that
the experiment has been defined, it needs to be implemented
and tested. The resulting implementation should be reviewed
by the community to make sure that there are no errors or
backdoors. We believe that there are several organizations who
have the capabilities to run the proposed experiment, such as
the IETF or the RIRs.
VI. RELATED WORK
We next describe existing work related to the manage-
ment of Internet resources using blockchain technology. In
particular, we attempt to identify how the previous work has
addressed the challenges pointed out in section IV.
Namecoin [30] is a working system that provides decentral-
ized namespaces improving security, privacy and censorship
resistance.
Namecoin supports name resolution for several namespaces,
including the DNS names within the .bit domain. While the .bit
domain belongs to the globally DNS hierarchy, the mechanism
for resolving .bit names is different than other DNS names, as
it requires querying the Namecoin blockchain for name reso-
lution. This implies changes in the host resolver. Technically,
Namecoin is a fork of Bitcoin with a new native token, the
Namecoin (NMC) token. As a consequence, Namecoin uses
a PoW consensus mechanism. The main challenge of the use
of PoW for a new coin is the lack of economic incentives
for miners to mine. In order to address this issue, Namecoin
uses merged-mining with Bitcoin. Namecoin DNS names are
paid using NMC tokens. The price of the NMC token is set
by the market. In theory, the NMC token price would be high
enough to prevent stockpiling. In reality, there was an initial
peak on the demand for attractive names such as well-known
trademarks, then a drop to its current value that is close to US$
0. Analysis showed that most of the names initially acquired
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belong to three entities, and are not used for name resolution,
so it should be assumed that were acquired for speculation.
As a take away, Namecoin is a valuable experience for
designing blockchain based systems for managing Internet
resources. First, the Namecoin experience shows that the fee
mechanism must use a high-enough fee to be effective. Leav-
ing the market to determine the fee seems unwise, especially
in the early phase, when there is little demand, the market
laws make the price to decrease, which in turn render the fee
mechanism ineffective.
However, there are fundamental differences between IP
addresses and DNS names, namely: first, while all IP addresses
have the same value, DNS names do not. Some DNS names are
more attractive than other (e.g., those reflecting trademarks).
Second, in order to use the .bit names allocated though Name-
coin, host modifications are required, while no modification in
end hosts are required to use IP addresses allocated through
the InBlock.
Internet blockchain [28] proposed the use of blockchains to
register IP addresses. They consider a Bitcoin-like blockchain
for the management of all Internet resources including IP
addresses, ASes, DNS and BGP route. The main goal is
to avoid centralization and the control of a single authority.
To reduce design and development risks associated to the
blockchain technology, they choose the Bitcoin as its under-
lying platform. They propose using multi-sig (a technology
in which a cryptographic operation can be performed or
validated with a minimum number of keys from a larger set)
to alleviate the key-lost problem. The Internet Blockchain
research concludes that this technology is still not mature
enough to support BGP route advertisement. For such a
reason they propose an incremental deployment, starting from
the management of RPKI functionalities, then proceeding
to support route advertisements, and finally providing name
resolution (currently solved by the DNS system). The paper
does not address key concerns such as stockpiling prevention
or secure bootstrapping.
Palisse et. al. [29] propose a blockchain mechanism to
manage IP addresses. A new blockchain would record IP
address allocation and delegation, based on a PoS consensus
mechanism, where addresses are the main asset. The main
concern regarding such approach is that in PoS blockchains,
the ones having more stakes are the ones with more chances to
mine new blocks. This means that the current authority of the
global IPv6 address pool (IANA) would certainly control the
majority of the stakes and probably the blockchain, defeating
the goal of preventing centralized control of the IP address
allocation system.
Like Namecoin [30], they propose an expiration mechanism
with renewal to prevent the lost-keys problem and to preserve
the consistency of the Internet resources. This work does not
consider concerns such as stockpiling or secure bootstrapping.
Kuerbis and Mueller [7] discuss the applicability of
blockchain technology to perform the Internet Routing Reg-
istry functions. Unforgeability and a provable timeline are
identified as desirable properties of a routing policy registry,
and are naturally provided by blockchains. They consider a
system in which operators could cryptographically point to
routing policy information repositories by using Blockstack,
a blockchain which facilitates decentralized naming systems.
Integration with RPKI key data can ensure the authenticity
and integrity of the data. InBlock is similar in the sense
that it stores the minimal metadata in the blockchain, and
points elsewhere to the storage of the information. In this
case, the authenticity and integrity of the routing policy data is
cryptographically linked to the identity to which the addresses
where allocated.
A. Alternative IP address allocation systems
There have been proposals for alternative mechanisms to
manage IP address allocations. In particular, there have been
several proposals for geographically aggregatable addresses
(the original IPv6 address architecture reserved an address
range for geographic-based unicast addresses [38]). The main
concern with geographic aggregation is that it opposes to the
business logic of the ISPs, since it would require that ISPs
covering a given geographic area to announce the routes for
the prefixes of that area and thus carry traffic for customers
of the competing ISPs in the region. InBlock does not argue
for any form of geographical aggregation. Addresses allocated
by InBlock can be used as any other global Unicast Address
assigned through the current IANA-RIR based system.
Transferable Block Lease (TABL) [39] proposes a market-
oriented IPv6 allocation mechanism. They propose that RIRs
set aside an address block that can be allocated without
the assessment of the needs to the applicant, with a fee
that is related to the size of allocation. The block allocated
though TABL would be transferable between parties. They
argue that such an approach would provide a simpler and
cheaper method for address management and would create the
incentives for resource holders to return the unused address
blocks. TABL is similar to the InBlock proposal in the sense
that they both propose a fee based mechanism to acquire IP
address allocations and in the analysis of how the resulting
mechanism would work. The main difference is that the TABL
still relies in the IANA RIR hierarchy for the whole address
management process, so the IANA and the RIRs still control
the address allocation (revoking and/or preventing parties to
obtain addresses) while the use of blockchain technology in
the InBlock limits the power of the allocation hierarchy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
The current IP allocation system exhibits the so-called
jurisdictional overflow problem, namely, that the consequences
of the application of the legal framework of the 5 countries
where the RIRs and IANA are based overflows its geographical
boundaries, de facto making entities in other countries subject
to their legal system in matters related to address allocation.
This may reasonably cause concern for some countries and
entities within those countries. We believe that blockchains
provide the means to build alternative approaches to the
global management of IP addresses that do not exhibit the
aforementioned jurisdictional overflow problem.
There are many different ways that blockchains can be used
to build a global IP address registry. We described InBlock,
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a decentralized autonomous organization running in Ethereum
that performs the IPv6 registry functions. Its design represents
a specific set of trade-offs. In particular, InBlock implements a
registry that is not under control of any single entity, implying
that no single entity can prevent another entity to obtain IP
address allocations. Moreover, InBlock provides quite strong
privacy guarantees and censorship resistance. Nevertheless, as
a trade-off, InBlock gives up the traceability and enforcement
features. This means that the IPv6 address registry functions
provided by InBlock cannot be used to trace the identity of
the holders of the resources if they do not voluntarily include
contact information in the registry. Similarly, the InBlock
cannot be used to restrict the Internet access to any entity
by revoking their address allocations (actually it is a goal of
the InBlock to prevent this situation).
The proposed InBlock design makes a particular set of
tradeoffs. Other tradeoffs are also possible and would result
in alternative approaches with different characteristics. As
future work we plan to work in a permissioned version of the
InBlock. A permissioned InBlock would include an additional
entity in the architecture, the InBlock registrars. The InBlock
registrars would be responsible for validating the identities of
the entities applying for resources. Once an entity obtains a
valid InBlock identity from the registrar, it can apply for IP
address allocation from the permsssioned InBlock in a similar
fashion than in the described InBlock. The role of registrars
could be fulfilled by the current RIRs, NIRs, or new organiza-
tions with national/regional scope. Compared to InBlock, this
mechanism provides much improved traceability. This trace-
ability is achieved at the cost of requiring the permission of
one of the organizations controlling the blockchain. However,
compared to the current allocation system, no hierarchy would
exist, and the capacity to revoke allocations could be largely
restricted. Therefore, even the perisssioned InBlock would
provide a better match the existing jurisdictional scope than the
current system, and thus, could represent a better fit between
the Internet and the geopolitical governance.
The InBlock design described here aims to achieve some
defined goals (uniqueness, stockpiling prevention, aggregation
preservation, etc.) by means of some mechanism (blockchain
consensus, pricing, limits on the number of AS number
involved in the delegations, etc.). The extent to which these
goals can be achieved with these measures can only be derived
from real experience. We also appreciate a lack of experience
in the use of blockchains for solving real-world problems.
Because of this, this is a call to arms for experiments on
the use of blockchain technology for Internet governance
in general and for implementing IP registry functions in
particular. We propose to experiment with InBlock for IPv6
address allocation. We believe this experiment will provide
useful hand-on experience about how blockchains can be used
for managing allocations. Other experiments using other mech-
anisms that make different trade-offs would also be useful.
These experiments would not only inform how to evolve
Internet governance towards more decentralized approaches,
but would also help to shape the future blockchain regulation.
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